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Abstract
This paper proposes the introduction of an automatic veriﬁcation phase for a subway control
software development process in which bounded model checking (BMC) and induction proof would
be used to anticipate error discovery and increase the quality of the ﬁnal product. We report the
tests we developed for some safety rules of two actual sections of a subway track and the results
we achieved. We conclude that the technique seems feasible for the problem domain, but the issue
requires extensive research to allow an exact understanding of which requirements the use of the
BMC meets, and actual beneﬁts this approach might bring to the project.
Keywords: Bounded model checking, safety requirements model checking, subway control
software model checking.
1 Introduction
Computer-controlled systems had a boost in the last few years, as much as
the problems that may arise due to software errors. The problem is even more
serious when we consider that the systems to be controlled are becoming more
and more complex, whereas the delivery times are the same as before, if not
shorter. While software correctness may be a very important issue for non-
safety-related systems, it is critical for systems controlling devices that can
put human lives as well as expensive equipment and installation at risk.
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This paper describes an eﬀort to assess the feasibility of model checking
the software controlling a section of an actual subway system. A subway track
may be large enough to make it necessary to divide it into many sections and
to assign to each section a controller running its own speciﬁc (safety-related)
software. A section normally encompasses a small number of stations, which
means that the software controlling it may be relatively complex. In order to
mitigate the risks of delivering an implementation with errors, the company
developing the controller deﬁnes a veriﬁcation and validation (V&V) process
with inspection and test activities in well-deﬁned phases.
We believe that there are some solid reasons for implementing an automatic
veriﬁcation process for that kind of development. Firstly, it is a well-known
fact that ﬁxing a software error becomes more and more expensive as the
project progresses. The use of model checking immediately after the software
is ready for release to the inspection phase may anticipate error discovery,
thereby generating savings. Secondly, it may also contribute to an improve-
ment in the quality of the ﬁnal product, because an automatic veriﬁcation
may uncover subtle errors that would not be uncovered otherwise. Thirdly,
the veriﬁcation activities presented here may represent reduced man-hours
when compared to other activities in the development process. Finally, most
of the work done for the ﬁrst software release may be reused during the de-
velopment of the next releases.
There is some research on the automatic veriﬁcation of railway control
software. Since, in general, the controlled railway and its associated software
can be easily and automatically reduced to a Finite State Machine (FSM), it
is natural that model checking and other techniques exploiting that kind of
formalism have been used to tackle the problem. Examples in the literature
are [8], [7], [6], [9], [11], and [12].
Our approach is close to [8], [7] and [6]. The ﬁrst common point between all
the works is the problem domain: railway control software written in languages
that are close to each other. [8] describes the veriﬁcation of some safety rules
of a relatively simple Dutch station. The tool that was used is the St˚almarck
theorem prover. The second work uses a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)
based model checker to verify both the same station that [8] veriﬁed as well
as a more complex one. Both works are related to ours because, although
they used diﬀerent techniques than us, they intended to verify safety rules for
railway control software using an exhaustive state-space exploration. Another
shared point is that the techniques they used allow the veriﬁcation of rules
which may exhibit very general patterns.
[6] uses bounded model checking (BMC) to verify some safety invariants
and proposes using it at the end of the implementation phase of the develop-
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ment process. It is also concerned with implementing the veriﬁcation phase
with both low impact on the process and no requirement for personnel train-
ing. Although we intend to verify rules that exhibit more general patterns
than [6], our work is close to it for two main reasons. First, and in spite of
some diﬀerent points of view, both works are concerned with the development
process and the impact caused by an automatic veriﬁcation phase. Second,
we use the same kind of technique (SAT-based bounded model checking).
Hence, we think we are contributing to [8] and [7] by discussing the use of
a veriﬁcation phase in the development process and to [6] by proposing a more
general way of verifying the safety rules, as well as by proposing some diﬀerent
ways of executing the activities associated with the automatic veriﬁcation
phase. As a further contribution, this paper intends to draw the attention to
the inﬂuence of the software structure in the format of the speciﬁcation to be
veriﬁed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the
system to be veriﬁed and discusses the beneﬁts of our proposal that includes an
automatic veriﬁcation activity. Section 3 introduces the formalisms associated
with BMC and explains how we implemented the use of induction proofs.
Section 4 describes the experiments that we developed and shows their results.
Section 5 discusses some issues and compares our results and proposals with
others. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper and shows some future steps.
2 System description
The software to be veriﬁed implements the control of a track section that is
partially represented in Figure 1. The ﬁgure shows two tracks labeled 1 and
2 that can be merged by two points labeled X99-1 and X99-2. The tracks are
divided into about 40 track segments called track-circuits, each one labeled
either as 1Lnn or 2Lnn, depending on the track in which they are located.
Figure 1 shows only ten of the available track-circuits.
Except for 1L06 and 2L06, two transmitters delimit each track-circuit.
Each transmitter is able to send a speed-code to a train occupying one of
the track-circuits delimited by it. The speed-code informs the train of the
maximum speed it is allowed to move on that track-circuit and it is transmitted
by outputting a modulated electrical current throughout the tracks. There
are speed-codes corresponding to 10, 35, 50, 60, and 68 km/h. Not all the
transmitters are able to transmit all the codes. By construction, it is not
possible that the signal transmitted by one transmitter reaches a track-circuit
not delimited by it.
Each train running on the track is equipped with a front antenna. The
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Fig. 1. Section to be veriﬁed
antenna captures the current sent by the transmitter located in front of the
train, but is not able to receive the signal sent from the transmitter located
behind. That is so because the train axes short-circuit the tracks, and as a
result the electrical current transmitted from behind the train does not reach
the antenna. The train is also equipped with an internal vital controller,
ensuring that it never moves at a speed higher than the one corresponding to
the speed-code, except in the transitions from a higher to a lower speed-code.
In those cases, the train is forced to follow a velocity proﬁle in order to reach
the lower velocity before it moves away for a ﬁxed maximum distance.
Each track-circuit is also capable of detecting whether a train occupies it
or not. The hardware associated with this capability is not shown in Figure
1.
Track-circuits 1L06 and 2L06 are delimited by electrical insulators. The
speed-codes thereon are transmitted by the transmitters installed at the ends
of each track-circuit, like in any other track-circuit. The diﬀerence here is
that the transmitters responsible for the speed-code of each of these track-
circuits are interconnected, so in practice the same signal is generated by all
the transmitters regardless of the direction of the train movement.
Figure 1 also shows two points between 1L06 and 2L06 which are respon-
sible for making the trains shift from track 1 to track 2 and vice versa. Each
point is able to be in normal (train does not shift tracks) or reverse (train shift
tracks) position. The equipment has digital outputs, so that the controller is
able to detect their position. There is also an output from the controller to
each point. The output is intended to lock the point, so it does not move
accidentally.
Finally, Figure 1 shows four signals labeled as X99-A/D. Each one of these
signals can be either turned oﬀ or on. In the former case the train must stop.
When it is in the on state, the signal is green and allows the train to go
(provided the speed-code also allows it to do so).
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2.1 The control software
The control software runs on Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) equipment
implementing all the necessary digital inputs and outputs for each device or
track-circuit being controlled. Each input or output is represented by its own
variable. The software is implemented as a list of about 480 assignments
involving digital inputs, digital outputs and internal state Boolean variables.
There are about 300 digital inputs. All the assignments are in the format
Vi = f(v0, v1, . . . , vn), where Vi is either a state or an output variable and
v0, v1, . . . , vn are variables of any of the three kinds. The function f accepts
only three binary operators, namely NOT (represented by a “.”), AND (“*”),
and OR (“+”). There may be some few tens of operands at the right-hand side
of each assignment. Parentheses may be used in order to change the default
operator priority. It is not allowed to deﬁne more than one assignment for a
certain output or state variable. As an implementation rule, names of variables
have a preﬁx which indicates the equipment or track-circuit associated with
it, as well as a suﬃx denoting its meaning.
The equipment controlling the railway has an executive software respon-
sible for managing the internal tasks the equipment must perform. The exec-
utive loop reads all the inputs and assigns their values to the corresponding
variables, allows the execution of the assignment list, and ﬁnally sends the
values of the calculated outputs to the hardware interfacing the physical de-
vices. The only diﬀerence between digital inputs, digital outputs, and state
variables is that the former are variables whose values are assigned by the
executive software only. The other variables, on the contrary, are always as-
signed a new value in every execution cycle of the assignment list. Their values
are preserved between two consecutive cycles. From the assignment list point
of view, there is no diﬀerence between digital outputs and state variables. In
this paper we are interested in the execution of the assignment list. The time
interval between any two consecutive cycles is not necessarily ﬁxed. Usually,
it is less than 100 ms.
Table 1 shows all the naming convention for variables we are interested in
this paper. In the table, tc, tc1,and tc2 denote track-circuit names, sc denotes
the speed of the corresponding speed-code, p denotes a point name, and sgn
denotes a signal name.
2.2 The proposed development process
The current development process is shown in Figure 2. It begins with the
release of a speciﬁcation that states the safety rules in natural language and
gives examples of how the assignments would typically be implemented. The
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Table 1
Variables of interest for safety veriﬁcation
Variable
group
Input -
Output
Meaning
pNWCK I Indicates that the point is in nor-
mal (1) or not in normal (0) po-
sition. Example: X99-1NWCK.
pRWCK I Indicates that the point is in re-
verse (1) or not in reverse (0) po-
sition. Example: X99-1RWCK.
tcTP I Indicates if the track-circuit is
occupied (0) or unoccupied (1).
Example: 1L05TP.
pLS O Locks (0) or unlocks (1) the point
p. Example: X99-1LS.
sgn-G O Turns the signal ON (1) or OFF
(0). Example: X99-AG.
tc1-tc2-sc O Forces the transmission of cor-
responding speed-code in the
transmitter located between tc1
and tc2. Example: 1L05-1L04-
35
software implementation is based on the speciﬁcation and on the drawings
of each section. The drawings convey information about the organization of
tracks into track-circuits, points, and signals, as well as information about
track speeds. After the implementation phase, an independent expert engi-
neer inspects the software. The last phase is platform testing, performed by
personnel not directly related to the implementation phase. Figure 2 shows
the natural ﬂow of the project, as well as the feedbacks it suﬀers when errors
are discovered in later phases.
Although very reliable implementations can be (and are) delivered with
that process, we think that the project could beneﬁt from the introduction of
an automatic veriﬁcation phase. The beneﬁts we think that may be achieved
are:
• Earlier detection of errors. It is well known that the earlier an error is
detected, the lower its impact on the schedule and costs of the project.
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Fig. 2. The current development process
The insertion of an automatic veriﬁcation activity immediately after the
completion of the implementation phase may uncover errors before the code
is sent to the expensive inspection and test phases, lowering the costs and
delivery time. [9] references some studies concluding that error discovery
shift from inspection to testing as projects become more complex. Although
we have no equivalent data for the kind of project under study we believe
that it is also the case, since it is reasonable to believe that a human veriﬁer
can eﬀectively realize inspections in the small, but very hardly he/she will
be able to do the same in the large.
• Improvement in the overall quality. The implementation may have
some very subtle errors that cannot be uncovered by either tests or inspec-
tion, but can be detected by an exhaustive automatic analysis.
• Much of the work done in the ﬁrst release can be reused for sub-
sequent releases. Typically, second and later releases neither signiﬁcantly
change the safety rules nor the internal structure of the software. In such
cases, most if not all the model used for the veriﬁcation of the ﬁrst release
can be reused.
We propose a change in the current development process, depicted in Fig-
ure 3. We included an automatic veriﬁcation phase immediately after the
implementation phase, using model checking as the veriﬁcation technique.
The reason for that is because model checking ﬁts well into the problem, as
we will see in section 4. Another reason is that good model checkers are easily
available nowadays.
We cannot guarantee that the automatic veriﬁcation phase uncovers all
the implementation errors. Our objective is to anticipate their ﬁnding.
3 Formal models for system veriﬁcation
In this section we introduce the temporal logic used in the formal veriﬁca-
tion process. We also introduce model checking very brieﬂy and explain the
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Fig. 3. The proposed development process
technique that we intend to use to verify the properties of the system under
study.
3.1 LTL Temporal logic
A Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formula uses atomic propositions, Boolean
operators and temporal operators to deﬁne the properties that must hold for
the system under study. Although it is possible to deﬁne many LTL operators,
the most used are: Ff (formula f will eventually be valid), Gf (formula f is
globally valid, which means that it is valid now and will be valid in any future
state), f1Uf2 (f1 is valid until f2 eventually becomes valid), f1Wf2 (f1 is valid
until f2 becomes valid), and Xf (f will be valid on the next state).
Mathematically, the syntax of an LTL formula given a set AP of atomic
propositions is deﬁned according to the following rules [5]:
• An atomic proposition p ∈ AP is an LTL formula.
• if f1 and f2 are LTL formulas, then ¬f1 and f1 ∧ f2 are LTL formulas.
• if f1 and f2 are LTL formulas, then Ff1, Gf1, f1Uf2, f1Wf2, and Xf1 are LTL
formulas.
The semantics of LTL is based on the concept of a Finite State Machine
(FSM) path. A path is an inﬁnite sequence of states π = (s0, s1, . . .), where
s0 is the ﬁrst state of the path and is not necessarily the initial state of the
FSM. Firstly, we will need to deﬁne the following notation for a FSM M :
• πi is the suﬃx of π which has si as the ﬁrst state.
• M , π |= f means that f holds at s0.
Now we can deﬁne the semantics of an LTL formula according the following
rules:
• M , π |= f iﬀ f is true on state s0.
• M , π |= ¬f iﬀ f does not hold at s0.
• M , π |= f
1
∧ f2 iﬀ (M , π |= f 1) and (M , π |= f 2).
• M , π |=Xf iﬀ M , π1|= f .
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• M , π |= f
1
Uf2 iﬀ there is a k ≥ 0 such that M , π
k|= f
2
and M , πi|= f
1
for
any 0 ≤ i < k .
As an abbreviation, we may write M |= f whenever it is implicit that the
ﬁrst state of the path is one of the initial states of the model. Obviously, other
common Boolean operators like ∨, → and ←→ can be deﬁned from ¬ and ∧.
The operators F, G, and W may be deﬁned respectively as Ff ≡ (trueUf ),
Gf ≡ ¬F¬f , and f1Wf2 ≡ (f1Uf2) ∨Gf1.
3.2 Model checking
Model checking is a set of techniques used to verify some temporal logic spec-
iﬁcation of a system modeled into an FSM by exhaustively analyzing all its
states and transitions. We usually have a set AP of atomic propositions, an
FSM M = (S , S0,R,L) and a speciﬁcation f stated in some temporal logic,
where S is a ﬁnite set of states, S0 ⊆ S is the set of initial states, R ⊆ S × S
is the total transition relation (i.e., any state has at least one successor) and
L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with the atomic propositions
that are true in that state [5]. The model checker tries to verify if M |= f for
all the paths starting from the initial states of the model and, if it does not,
it usually issues a counter-example which can be used to debug the system.
The most common challenge when using model checking is to deal with
the state explosion problem created by the combination of all possible values
of the system variables. Sometimes it is necessary to abstract some system
behavior in order to enable the veriﬁcation of a given speciﬁcation with a
simpliﬁed model. This approach has some drawbacks, namely that it may
demand a manual interference in the process and cause some errors in the
veriﬁcation. If possible, we would like to avoid any kind of abstraction when
trying to verify the control software we are interested in.
There are many model checking techniques which are intended to be used
in diﬀerent kinds of applications. They can be divided into two main groups:
the group of techniques using an explicit representation for the states of the
FSM and the group using a symbolic representation for them. In the ﬁrst
group, each state is individually analyzed and stored into the computer main
memory, while the second group uses propositional formulas describing sets of
states as well as transition relations. The explicit representation methods are
usually used when the system can be modeled by an FSM limited in its size
by some few million states. That limit is usually given by the amount of main
memory available on the computers in use nowadays. Since we are dealing
with systems with a number of states much larger than that limit, explicit
representation techniques would not be our ﬁrst choice.
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Typically, symbolic model checkers use a technique by which they represent
sets of states complying with some propositional formula, instead of working
with individual states. One of the most used methods is based on ﬁxpoints
calculation. In its basic form, a model checker based on this technique starts
with a set representing either all or none of the states of the model, depending
on the kind of speciﬁcation under analysis. That set is iteratively updated by
the application of the transition relation until a ﬁxpoint is eventually reached.
The model checker then veriﬁes if all the initial states belong to that ﬁxpoint.
If that is the case, the speciﬁcation holds. Most of the model checkers using
this kind of technique employ a BDD [3] library for creating Boolean formulas
representing the state sets and the transition relations. This technique works
ﬁne for some models with few hundreds Boolean variables, but fails when
the models are larger than that. The main reason for that is the signiﬁcant
amount of memory and CPU time needed to deal with the state sets and
transition relations when the model becomes larger. Even when BDD-based
model checking works, it is sometimes necessary to carefully set up the model
checker framework, because some parameters like variable orderings and the
algorithm used for calculating the ﬁxpoints may be critical to the success of
the method. The limitations and diﬃculties for medium to large-sized models
do not make BDD-based model checkers ideal candidates to the systems that
we want to verify if we do not consider using abstraction.
The limitations of the BDD solution and the progress that was achieved in
recent years with the invention of faster algorithms for the satisﬁability (SAT)
of propositional formulas problem created the conditions for the introduction
of bounded model checking [2]. In BMC, both the transition relations and
the set of states are still represented by propositional formulas. Initially, the
model checker builds a formula that is the conjunction of the initial states of
the system and the negation of the speciﬁcation under analysis. The formula
is then analyzed by a SAT solver which tries to ﬁnd a valuation that makes
it true. If there is such a valuation, it is used as a counter-example for the
speciﬁcation. If there is no such valuation, nothing can be said about the
truth of the speciﬁcation and the model checker starts a new cycle. In the
new cycle, the formula to be analyzed is: a disjunction of the initial states, the
transition relation, and the negation of the speciﬁcation. The model checker
tries to ﬁnd a counter-example for the speciﬁcation, taking into account the
initial states as well as their successors. Again, the formula is sent to the
SAT solver. The process continues until either a counter-example is found,
the maximum conﬁgured number of iterations k is reached or the formula to
be analyzed becomes large enough to make its analysis infeasible.
Compared to the classical unbounded model checking, BMC has some
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disadvantages and advantages. The main disadvantage is that it is not able,
in general, to say something about the truth of the required speciﬁcation in
case it either holds or the counter-example is large enough to be handled by
the SAT solver. Thus, BMC is primarily an error-ﬁnder tool.
The advantages of BMC over unbounded model checking are manyfold.
First, the user does not need to set up the environment manually. Usually, the
default parameters will suﬃce. Second, the model checker is able to deal with
thousands of variables instead of hundreds and, in doing so, it uses much less
memory and spends much less computer time. Third, the generated counter-
example is guaranteed to be minimum, simplifying the analysis of the problem.
The ﬁrst and second features will be of great value for us in our veriﬁcation
process.
3.3 Robust systems and induction proofs
A model is deﬁned in [7] as robust with respect to a speciﬁcation f if f holds
for all possible states of the model, even if they are not reachable from the
initial states. Mathematically, an FSM model M = (S , S0,R,L) is robust with
respect to f if, given M ′ = (S , S ,R,L), M |= f → M ′|= f .
A robust model with respect to the speciﬁcation f has an interesting fea-
ture, namely that if f = f (p0, p1, . . . ,Xp0,Xp1, . . . ,X
kp0,X
kp1, . . .) holds for
all ﬁnite sequence of k+1 states starting from the initial states s0, then Gf also
holds. In other words, we can say that M ′ |= f → M |=Gf . In fact, any ﬁnite
state sequence for which f holds ends at some ﬁnal state sk which belongs,
itself, to the set of the initial states of the modiﬁed model M ′. Therefore, the
state sk is the initial state of a new ﬁnite sequence for which f also holds,
and inductively M |=Gf . We deﬁne the depth of a formula as the maximum
number k of nested X operators.
For example, in the subway system under consideration we can expect
that signal X99-A must be turned oﬀ whenever point X99-1 is in reverse. This
rule could be speciﬁed as G(X99-1RWCK→ F(¬X99-AG W¬X99-1RWCK)).
The sentence says that it is always true (G) that if X99-1 is in reverse then
signal X99-A will be eventually (F) turned oﬀ and stay at that state until (W)
X99-1 is not reversed. This sentence format has two drawbacks. The ﬁrst one
is that we have no information about the number of cycles the software takes
to respond to the new condition. It is a sensible issue because if we keep
the LTL speciﬁcation as stated above, we are theoretically accepting long
response times that could turn the implementation unable to quickly respond
to an emergency situation, making it unsafe. Moreover, in order to use the
inductive proof scheme we need to have a bound k on the number of software
cycles and the sentence, as stated above, does not carry any information about
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that.
We worked this problem out by analyzing the source code for the complete-
ness of the proof. Rather than trying to use a sentence like the one above,
we start looking for a speciﬁcation that could be stated as (X99-1RWCK
→ Xk¬X99-AG), which means that the signal X99-AG is turned oﬀ k cycles
after point X99-1 is in reverse. If the sentence can be proved true for a given
k and a generic initial condition, the safety rule we are interesting in would
be veriﬁed if k is to be considered small enough. In fact, it would be proven
that if the point is in reverse at any state si , then the signal is oﬀ at any
successor state si+k . It also means that the signal will stay oﬀ while the point
keeps its reverse state because if the point is still in reverse at s i+1 then the
signal will be oﬀ at s i+k+1 and so on. In our example, we concluded after a
quick source code analysis that the speciﬁcation to be proved is (X99-1RWCK
→ XX¬X99-AG), and that a bound k = 2 would be enough to prove it.
4 Veriﬁcation and experiments
In this section we describe the tools we used, the safety rules we wanted
to verify, their translations into LTL, and the results we obtained from two
experiments.
4.1 Tools
We chose to use NuSMV [4] as the bounded model checker. It is a re-
implementation that extends the Symbolic Model Veriﬁer (SMV) [10], de-
veloped at the Carnegie Mellon University 3 . NuSMV accepts as input a ﬁle
which describes the model of the system to be veriﬁed. The input language
is basically the same language as deﬁned by SMV (the “SMV language”).
Therefore, we needed a program to automatically translate the original source
code into the SMV language. The translator we implemented creates a single
SMV input ﬁle declaring all the variables and the complete set of assignments
deﬁned by the original source code. There is a one to one correspondence
between the assignments in the original source code and the SMV input lan-
guage.
The translator is responsible for the following tasks:
• The assignment, and the operators and, or and not are represented by
diﬀerent symbols in both languages, so the original representation has to be
3 We used the NuSMV version 2.1.2, running under Cygwin and Windows XP. The version
implements both bounded and unbounded BDD-based model checking and is freely available
at http://nusmv.irst.itc.it/.
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converted according to the SMV language rules.
• The SMV language does not accept variables with a digit as the ﬁrst char-
acter, so the translator always includes an underscore ( ) at the beginning
of every variable.
• The SMV operator next is attached to any variable at the left-hand side
of an assignment. In doing so, we specify that the next state value of the
variable being assigned will be the result of the formula at the right-hand
side.
• The translator has to decide how it translates any variable var at the right-
hand side of an assignment. It can translate it just as “var” or it can
translate it as “next (var)”. The former case is used when, starting the
translation from the ﬁrst assignment, var has not already been used at the
left-hand side of an assignment. The later case is used otherwise.
The last task preserves the semantics of the original source code during its
translation into the SMV language. In the original source code, the assign-
ments are executed sequentially from top to bottom. The SMV language has
a diﬀerent semantics, since it considers that every assignment is executed in
parallel. Figure 4 shows an example of the translation from one language into
the other.
Original program:
A = .B * D * (C + A);
B = .A * D;
SMV translation:
next( A) := ! B & D & ( C | A);
next( B) := !next( A) & D;
4.2 Verifying the safety rules
We chose to check safety rules associated with the observable behavior of the
track. The software has a large set of variables which are used internally
and must comply to its internal rules. The violation of these rules may not
necessarily bring the system to an unsafe state, because the internal variables
do not directly change the current state of the track.
In order to use the model checking technique, we deﬁned four classes of
safety rules expected to hold. The set of rules does not completely describe all
the safety-related requirements of the system, but helps the feasibility analysis
of the use of model checking for that kind of system.
We classiﬁed the rules into four groups. We also recognized that there are
rules describing the way the system must respond to some input condition,
and others that must hold independently of the state of the inputs and can be
considered propositional invariants of the system. All the rules can be written
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in the following speciﬁcation formats:
• G(<inputcondition> → F(<safestate>W¬<inputcondition>)), for input-
dependent rules. It means that it is always true that if the input condition
happens, then a safe state will eventually be reached and the system will
stay at that safe state until the input condition is reset. Strictly speaking,
those rules may also be considered invariant properties of the system, be-
cause any Gf property can be considered to be so. However, in this paper,
we will reserve the word invariant to the propositional formulas that must
hold without any explicit dependency on the inputs.
• G(<invariant>), for rules that must always hold and do not depend ex-
plicitly on any input.
The four groups used to classify the rules are:
1. A transmitter does not transmit any kind of speed-code when
both track-circuits associated with it are occupied. As an example, we
must expect that the transmitter between 1L05 and 1L04 does not transmit
any speed-code if both 1L05 and 1L04 are occupied. This rule has the following
condition/safe state pair:
Condition: ¬1L05TP ∧¬ 1L04TP
Safe state: ¬1L05-1L04-35 ∧¬ 1L05-1L04-50 ∧¬ 1L05-1L04-68
The transmitter between 1L04 and 1L05 is able to transmit the speed-
codes corresponding to 35, 50, and 68 km/h only. The variables associated
with other speeds are not deﬁned in the program. Therefore they do not
belong to the transmitter safe state deﬁnition. Similar condition/safe state
pairs apply to the other transmitters.
2. Interlocking between points and signals. We devised the following
rules involving signals and points:
2.1. Both points are locked whenever any signal is turned on. An on-signal
enables the train passage through its points. Thus, for safety reasons, it is
necessary that both points be locked in order to avoid any accidental point
movement that may cause train derailment. This rule is input-independent
and may be stated by the following invariant:
Invariant: X99-AG ∨ X99-BG ∨ X99-CG ∨ X99-DG→ ¬X99-1LS ∧ ¬X99-2LS
2.2. It is not allowed to have more than one on signal if at least one of
the points is in reverse. The condition/safe state pair for that is:
Condition: X99-1RWCK ∨ X99-2RWCK
Safe state: ¬((X99-AG ∧ X99-CG) ∨ (X99-AG ∧ X99-DG) ∨ (X99-BG ∧ X99-CG) ∨
(X99-BG ∧ X99-DG))
2.3. All the signals must be turned oﬀ if both points are in reverse. That
means that even the passage from C to D or vice-versa is not allowed. The
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condition/safe state pair is:
Condition: X99-1RWCK ∧ X99-2RWCK
Safe state: ¬(X99-AG ∨ X99-BG ∨ X99-CG ∨ X99-DG)
2.4. Signals A and C must be turned oﬀ whenever point 1 is in reverse.
By the same token, signals B and D must also be turned oﬀ whenever point 2
is in reverse. The condition/safe state pairs of both rules are:
Condition 1: X99-1RWCK
Safe state 1: ¬(X99-AG ∨ X99-CG)
Condition 2: X99-2RWCK
Safe state 2: ¬(X99-BG ∨ X99-DG)
2.5. Both points must be in normal position whenever we have one on
signal at each track. The condition/safe state pair is:
Condition: ¬(X99-1NWCK ∧ X99-2NWCK)
Safe state: ¬((X99-AG ∧ X99-CG) ∨ (X99-AG ∧ X99-DG) ∨ (X99-BG ∧ X99-CG) ∨
(X99-BG ∧ X99-DG))
3. Opposite signals must never be on at the same time. We deﬁned
two invariants for that rule, which are listed below.
Invariant 1: ¬(X99-AG ∧ X99-BG)
Invariant 2: ¬(X99-CG ∧ X99-DG)
4. The speed-code, transmitted when a train is approaching an
oﬀ–signal, should always correspond to low speed. As an example, we
must expect that the speed-code is transmitted to the train that is approaching
signal A must not correspond to either 50 or 68 km/h. The condition/safe
pair for the example is given below. There are equivalent rules for the other
signals.
Invariant: ¬X99-AG→ ¬1L05-1L06-50 ∧ ¬1L05-1L06-68
4.3 Creating the LTL speciﬁcations
In order to prove the rules using the inductive procedure described above, we
have to create LTL speciﬁcations for those rules. The speciﬁcations may be
provable true after a ﬁnite number of cycles of the software being analyzed. We
have already given an example in which we found that the software needs two
cycles to turn signal X99-A oﬀ after point X99-1 is in reverse. Obviously, we
could expect that at least one cycle would be necessary, because the software
needs to be executed at least once before it can respond to any input change.
However, we do not have any means to know the necessary number of cycles a
priori without recurring to analysis. It could well be the case that the software
needed three or four cycles to respond.
In practice, analyzing the software is a matter of observing the sequence of
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assignments of the variables used by the rule to be veriﬁed and of the interme-
diary variables that may aﬀect them. After the analysis, the LTL formula is
written and checked. If the model checker indicates that the speciﬁcation does
not hold, it may be either because the LTL speciﬁcation was incorrectly stated
or because the software has some error. In both cases we have to re-analyze
the program with the help of the model checker counter-example.
Another way of creating an LTL speciﬁcation is assuming that the software
is correct and starting from a tentative speciﬁcation. If the model checker
states that the speciﬁcation holds, the process ends. Otherwise, we can create
a new tentative speciﬁcation until either we prove the rule or we give up
and consider analyzing the source code. Although we may have to run some
tentative speciﬁcations before we reach a valid one, we may save some time
and eﬀort because the model checker response time is short compared to the
time needed to analyze the source code. In the example given above, we could
start from the tentative speciﬁcation (X99-1RWCK → X ¬X99-AG). Since
the model checker would say that the speciﬁcation does not hold, we could
try (X99-1RWCK → XX ¬X99-AG). That speciﬁcation holds, so we would
have successfully saved time and eﬀort on not analyzing the code.
In brief, we spent only few hours writing the correct LTL speciﬁcations
for the problem at hand. Table 2 shows the results of that work. The second
column shows the LTL speciﬁcation used for checking the rules and the third
column gives the bound for model checking, i.e. the number of cycles the
software has to run in order to either go to the safe state or to be compliant
with the invariant.
One interesting point is the origin of the X operator used at the beginning
of speciﬁcations of groups 2.1, 3, and 4. These groups are responsible for
checking the input-independent invariants. It means that the LTL speciﬁca-
tions depend only on the variables calculated by the software. According to
the model we are using, the values of those variables are completely undeﬁned
before the ﬁrst software cycle. Therefore, it is not possible to guarantee any
rule concerning their values before the ﬁrst iteration. The X operator in front
of the formula reﬂects this argument. The LTL speciﬁcation of group 2.1 has
another X operator at the right-hand side of the → operator. It expresses
the fact that the software is written in a way that the assignments of the lock
commands (LS variables) are executed before the assignments of the signals
(G variables). Hence, the state of the signals will be reﬂected at the lock
command only at the next cycle.
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Table 2
LTL speciﬁcations for the rule groups
Rule LTL speciﬁcation k
1 (! 1L05TP& ! 1L04TP) ->X X (! 1L05-1L04-35& ! 1L05-1L04-50& ! 1L05-
1L04-68) and 39 others in the same format.
2
2.1 X (( X99-AG | X99-BG | X99-CG | X99-DG) ->
X (! X99-1LS &! X99-2LS))
2
2.2 ( X99-1RWCK | X99-2RWCK) ->
X !(( X99-AG & X99-CG) | ( X99-AG & X99-DG) | ( X99-BG &
X99-CG) | ( X99-BG & X99-DG))
1
2.3 ( X99-1RWCK & X99-2RWCK) ->
X !( X99-AG | X99-BG | X99-CG | X99-DG)
1
2.4 ( X99-1RWCK -> X !( X99-AG | X99-CG))
( X99-2RWCK -> X !( X99-BG | X99-DG))
1
2.5 !( X99-1NWCK & X99-2NWCK) ->
X !(( X99-AG & X99-CG) | ( X99-AG & X99-DG) | ( X99-BG &
X99-CG) | ( X99-BG & X99-DG))
1
3 X !( X99-AG & X99-BG) X !( X99-CG & X99-DG) 1
4 X ((! X99-AG) -> (! 1L05-1L06-50 & ! 1L05-1L06-68))
X ((! X99-BG) -> (! 1L07-1W06-35 & ! 1L07-1W06-50 & ! 1L07-1L06-68))
X ((! X99-CG) ->(! 2L07-2W06-35 & ! 2L07-2W06-50 & ! 2L07-2L06-68))
X ((! X99-DG) -> (! 2L05-2W06-50 & ! 2L05-2W06-68))
1
4.4 Experiments
All the rules were eﬃciently veriﬁed. Table 3 shows the group (G) that was
veriﬁed, the number (n) of properties in that group and the depth (k) of the
speciﬁcations. It also shows the memory needed by NuSMV (Mb) and the time
in seconds that it took to complete the veriﬁcation of all the group properties.
We used a computer with an Athlon 2800+ CPU.
It is possible to observe from Table 3 that the used technique circumvented
the state explosion problem. Moreover, the model checker achieved fast ver-
iﬁcation times. Considering that it was a very positive result, we tried the
veriﬁcation of the same classes of rules to a larger section. The new exper-
iment was a much more complicated track section, having about 800 digital
inputs, 1150 state variables, nearly 60 track-circuits, 7 points, and 18 signals.
N.G. Ferreira, P.S. Muniz Silva / Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 130 (2005) 323–343 339
We spent about four hours to write the new LTL speciﬁcations. The results
are shown in Table 4.
Table 3
Veriﬁcation of the ﬁrst section
G n k Mb t(s)
1 40 2 33 17.5
2.1 1 2 25 0.8
2.2-2.5 5 1 21 0.9
3 2 1 19 0.4
4 4 1 19 0.6
Table 4
Veriﬁcation of the second section
G n k Mb t(s)
1 43 2 83 42.1
2.1 2 2 65 5.5
2.1 3 3 77 19.5
2.2-2.5 9 1 54 5.4
3 9 1 50 3.9
4 14 1 50 4.7
5 Related work
The results described above are consonant with the successful results reported
by [8] and [6]. The later achieved veriﬁcation times of fractions of a second for
a system of about 2000 variables and k = 1. Both system size and veriﬁcation
times are close to ours. [7] successfully veriﬁed the control software of two
subway stations using a BDD-based model checker and proving speciﬁcations
written in a format close to ours, although the speciﬁcations were written
in CTL rather than LTL. During our experiments, we wanted to discover if
we would also be able to verify our properties using BDDs. Unfortunately,
NuSMV was not able to verify any speciﬁcation, so we decided to experiment
N.G. Ferreira, P.S. Muniz Silva / Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 130 (2005) 323–343340
with another easily available SMV implementation called Cadence SMV [1],
trying to verify one property of each of the four groups deﬁned above. The
results for the simpler section ranged from 25 seconds of execution time and
65 Mbytes of memory for verifying a property of group 1 to a failure in the
veriﬁcation of the property of group 4, due to lack of memory. No speciﬁcation
of the larger section could be veriﬁed. Hence, although the good results re-
ported by [7] with BDD-based model checking, we concluded that SAT-based
BMC seems to be much more promising for our domain.
Like us, [6] was not able to verify its system with BDDs and proposed
BMC. However, it suggests a diﬀerent way of verifying the safety properties:
instead of writing a speciﬁcation using temporal logic, it proposes the deﬁni-
tion of new variables that are appended to the end of the program. Those
variables represent system invariants and the value of each one is a function of
the current and next values of other variables. The domain expert engineers
should create the invariants based on their interpretation of the safety require-
ments. The rationale for this approach is that the authors believe that using a
language familiar to the expert domain engineers is crucial for their proposal
to be useful. We dispute that. Firstly, this approach limits the properties
that can be veriﬁed to depth 0 or 1 formulas, unless the developer creates new
intermediary variables to store older values (entangling the veriﬁcation and
bringing unwanted manual intervention). Secondly, we concluded that it is
easy to write down LTL speciﬁcations for the properties to be veriﬁed, since
we only need the X LTL operator as well as the traditional Boolean operators.
Thirdly, we are afraid that the chance of common mode errors increases with
that approach, because the expert domain engineers are responsible for many
tasks: interpreting the speciﬁcation stated in natural language, implementing
the program, and deﬁning the invariants in the same language of the control
software. The veriﬁcation may fail if either the interpretation of the require-
ments is incorrect or the wrongly implemented code is used somehow in the
deﬁnition of the invariants. Another drawback is that it makes it diﬃcult for
others to check whether the invariants are correctly stated. Thus, we think
that a better approach would be stating the safety properties either as condi-
tion/safety pairs or as invariants in the speciﬁcation document. The developer
would have to write the LTL formulas and run the model checker in order to
verify the properties. The LTL formulas would be implementation-dependent,
but could be easily assessed by independent reviewers.
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6 Conclusion and future work
We have presented the results of model checking two diﬀerent actual sections
of a subway track. The main problem that we could have faced was the state
explosion problem. However, experience showed that we were able to verify
all the rules in relatively short time, with no need for further abstractions,
which would demand more manual interference on the process as well as the
possibility of inserting errors into the veriﬁcation. An interesting point is that
although we used a model checker, we actually did not need one. A SAT solver
would suﬃce, because it is not possible to verify a temporal formula of depth
k in less than k applications of the transition relation. Hence, there is no
use in trying to ﬁnd a counter-example smaller than k . However, we decided
to use NuSMV because it easily represents the model to be veriﬁed and is
freely available. Another point in favor of the model checker is that the time
spent on ﬁnding counter-examples smaller than the depth of the formulas is
not a problem, given its fast response time. We conclude that, for the speciﬁc
kind of subway control software that was examined, an automatic veriﬁcation
process based on model checking and on the described approach seems to be
feasible.
This work opens some paths for future works. One of them is the automatic
veriﬁcation of software functional requirements on this particular domain. Ex-
amples of functional requirements are the conditions for a route approval, the
conditions for cancelling a route, and how the system must depict a point
position while it is moving. Another essential point to be studied is to under-
stand the coverage degree that can be achieved with that kind of veriﬁcation,
its costs, and beneﬁts to the project.
References
[1] Cadence SMV. Cadence SMV and its documentation can be downloaded from
http://www-cad.eecs.berkeley.edu/∼kenmcmil/smv/.
[2] A. Biere, A. Cimatti, E. Clarke, and Y. Zhu. Symbolic model checking without BDDs. In
Proceedings of TACAS 1999, number 1579 in LNCS, page 193. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[3] R. Bryant. Graph-based algorithms for boolean function manipulation. IEEE Transactions
on Computers, C35(8):677–691, 1986.
[4] A. Cimatti, E. Clarke, F. Giunchiglia, and M. Roveri. NuSMV: a new symbolic model checker.
International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 2(4):410–425, 2000.
[5] E. Clarke, O. Grumberg, and D. A. Peled. Model Checking. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
[6] G. Dipoppa, G. D’Alessandro, R. Semprini, and E. Tronci. Integrating automatic veriﬁcation
of safety requirements in railway interlocking system design. In Proceedings of HASE 2001,
pages 209–219. IEEE Computer Society, 2001.
N.G. Ferreira, P.S. Muniz Silva / Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 130 (2005) 323–343342
[7] C. Eisner. Using symbolic model checking to verify the railway stations of Hoorn-
Kersenboogerd and Heerhugowaard. In Proceedings of CHARME 1999, number 1703 in LNCS,
pages 97–109. Springer-Verlag, 1999.
[8] W. Fokkink. Safety criteria for Hoorn-Kersenboogerd railway station. Logic Group Preprint
Series 135, Utrecht University, 1995.
[9] M. Huber and S. King. Towards an integrated model checker for railway signalling data. In
Proceedings of FME 2002, number 2391 in LNCS, page 204. Springer-Verlag, 2002.
[10] K. McMillan. Symbolic Model Checking: An Approach to the State Explosian Problem. Kluwer
Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, USA, 1993.
[11] K. Winter. Model checking railway interlocking systems. In M. Oudshoorn, editor, Proceedings
of Australian Computer Science Conference (ACSC 2002), number 24(1), pages 303–310.
Australian Computer Science Communications, 2002.
[12] K. Winter and N. Robinson. Modelling large railway interlockings and model checking
small ones. In M. Oudshoorn, editor, Proceedings of the 26th Australian Computer Science
Conference (ACSC 2003), pages 309–316, 2003.
N.G. Ferreira, P.S. Muniz Silva / Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 130 (2005) 323–343 343
